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SUMMARY
The rose-grain aphid (RGA) is an introduced pest which
attacks cereals and can cause considerable loss of yield.
It is a pest of some economic concern in affected grain
growing areas of New Zealand. In 1985 the DSIR introduced a
parasitoid, Aphidius rhopalosiphi, in an effort to contro~
RGA by biological means. This study aims to perform an
economic evaluation of the biocontrol of RGA in New Zealand.
1
RGA damage to cereal crops in this country was studied
by the DSIR in 1983-84 and 1984-85, prior to introduction of
the parasitoid. Using this work, estimates were derived of
the annual cost of RGA damage to New Zealand's cereal crops.
It was calculated that RGA could cause between $0.5 million
and $10 million damage annually in Canterbury alone.
In addition to these costs, RGA acts as a vector for
Barley Yellow Dwarf Virus disease which can cause losses of
up to 20% - 30% in barley crops in localised areas.
Chemical control, the only suggested alternative to
biocontrol of RGA, was estimated to cost at least $3.6
million annually, if it was to be effective.
The impact of the parasitoid on RGA has been rapid.
In a short space of time it has become established
throughout New Zealand and very high levels of parasitoid
have been recorded. DSIR experts consider that the RGA has
been controlled and will in future no longer be a pest of
significant economic importance due to biocontrol.
An informal survey of a small number of Canterbury
farmers offers confirming evidence that aphids are perceived
as a problem on cereal crops and that aphid numbers appeared
to have declined in the past two to three years.
The total cost of DSIR research into the integrated
pest management of RGA is estimated to have been
approximately $1.32 million (in 1988 dollars). The
biological control component of this research cost about
$264,000. Against this figure, estimates of the annual
benefit of biocontrol range from $300,000 to $5 million, so
that the DSIR's initial investment in the whole research
programme is likely to be repaid in savings to the community
within at most seven years under a 10% discount rate and
conservative assumptions. If the biocontrol component of
the research is treated separately, the costs of biocontrol
have already been repaid.
The evaluation of biocontrol shows quite clearly that
based on the data available, and assumptions made, this
particular biocontrol project was fully justified on
economic grounds. When giving consideration to such
projects in future it will be important to perform at least
a preliminary economic analysis before committing the
required resources to them.
(v)

1.1
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The rose-grain aphid (Metopolophium dirhodum) (RGA) was
first~ found in New Zealand in 1982. It is a pest which
attacks cereals and can cause considerable loss of yield in
cereal crops. RGA has also been implicated as a vector in
the transmission of barley yellow dwarf virus disease.
Chemical treatment with insecticides to control the aphid
has been necessary in recent years. All these factors
combine to suggest that RGA is therefore a pest of some
economic concern in the affected grain growing areas of New
Zealand.
In order to control the spread of RGA and limit the
damage it might cause, in 1985 the DSIR introduced to New
Zealand a parasitoid known to affect RGA populations in
England and France. This biological agent, Aphidius
rhopalosiphi, has since been released at a number of sites
throughout Canterbury and also in Marlborough, Southland and
Manawatu. The parasitoid has become well established in
some districts (Stufkens and Farrell 1987a) and high levels
of parasitism have been recorded (Farrell pers comm).
However, no attempt has been made to determine the
economic benefits of biocontrol of the RGA. While the
establishment of the parasitoid suggests that the biocontrol
project has been successful, it is important to attempt to
measure the success or otherwise of the project in economic
terms. Economic benefits obtained from DSIR activities of
this nature represent gains to the nation as a whole. From
a social standpoint it is desirable to be able to identify
these benefits in order to facilitate the efficient
allocation of resources. It is also sensible to evaluate
the project from an economic perspective to ensure that the
considerable expense involved in undertaking the biocontrol
of RGA was justified. In the foreseeable future, with
constraints on finance for such projects becoming tighter,
it will become increasingly important to perform such
analyses prior to commencing research in order to identify
those areas most likely to achieve significant returns.
The logical conceptual framework within which to carry
out such an economic evaluation is cost-benefit analysis. A
number of cost-benefit analyses of biological control
projects have been undertaken in the past, although very few
in New Zealand. Cost-benefit analysis essentially consists
of enumerating the potential costs and benefits of a
possible course of action, and where possible quantifying
these costs and benefits. Available data gathered by the
DSIR in the course of monitoring the RGA and the pa~asitoid
enables reasonable estimates of the costs and benefits
(1 )
(2 )
associated with this biocontrol project to be derived.
Chapter 2 discusses the costs to New Zealand agriculture of
RGA in the absence of any form of control. These costs may
be identified as the cost of crop yield losses through
direct RGA damage, the cost of yield losses through barley
yellow dwarf virus damage transmitted by RGA, and the cost
of chemical control of RGA.
~1
In Chapter 3, evidence of the impact of the parasitoid
on RGA is examined. Estimates of the economic benefit of
the parasitoid are obtained. Chapter 4 brings together the
estimates of the costs imposed by the RGA and the benefits
of the parasitoid to derive an estimated net benefit or
return from the biological control project. This represents
an assessment of the economic gain to the nation as a whole
from the biocontrol of RGA.
The following section briefly discusses the informal
farmer survey conducted and some of the key findings of this
survey.
1.2 Informal Farmer Survey
As the data regarding aphid damage leans heavily on
DSIR research, it was felt to be desirable to obtain some
input from affected farmers. In order to do this an
informal telephone survey of Canterbury farmers was
conducted. The names of several farmers who have had a past
contact with Lincoln College were obtained from the Lincoln
College Farm Management Department and ten farmers were
telephoned and queried about aphids and crop management.
Specifically, farmers were asked what crops they believed
aphids to occur on in the greatest numbers, what crops, if
any, had been sprayed specifically for aphids in recent
years, and whether a decline in aphid numbers had been
noticed over the last two to three years.
The results generally confirmed the DSIR research
discussed in later chapters although the survey should not
be construed as providing scientific evidence. Farmers
differed over which crop, if any, appeared to attract most
aphids with the usual perception being that most crops were
at risk to similar degree. Barley was generally mentioned,
but wheat was also felt to be prone to high numbers of
aphids by some respondents. Only three of the ten farmers
reported having sprayed for aphids in the past two years,
and these were concerned about Barley Yellow Dwarf Virus
disease rather than RGA control. These farmers sprayed
insecticide or aphicide routinely on cereals, regardless of
aphid numbers.
The general consensus was
declined - some of the farmers
that there were currently less
before being specifically asked.
felt there had been no change
that aphid numbers had
volunteered their opinion
aphids than in past years
A number (3 of the 10)
while none of the farmers
( 3 )
surveyed believed there had been an increase in aphids in
the last 2-3 years.
Of the farmers surveyed, two were from the Southbridge
area, three from the Leeston area, three from Irwell and two
from Dunsandel. This represents a fairly localised region
of C~nterbury. There was a high degree of consensus between
the r~spondents with most giving very similar answers to the
questions posed. This admittedly very small and non-random
sample of farmers gives at least some input to the analysis
from sources outside the DSIR and the general unanimity of
responses lends some weight to the results of DSIR
research.

CHAPTER 2
One major economic cost of RGA is the direct damage it
may cause to cereal crops. This results in a loss of yield,
which can have severe financial implications for farmers and
the nation as a whole. This section reviews some of the
literature on the effects of RGA on cereal crop yields,
particularly under New Zealand conditions. Using this
information, it aims to derive estimates of the economic
costs of RGA to New Zealand agriculture in the absence of
any form of control for the pest.
Unchecked, populations of RGA may reach very high
levels. In 1984, a level of 240 aphids/tiller was recorded
in spring oats grown at Lincoln (Stufkens and Farrell,
1985a) . Such aphid levels have the potential to cause
significant loss of yield in affected cereal crops. Yield
loss caused by aphids may be due to both direct and indirect
effects, according to Rabbinge et al. (1981) . Direct
consumption of the plants accounts for some of the yield
loss but Rabbinge et al. also found that indirectly the
honeydew secreted by aphids causes further losses by
hindering photosynthesis and by promoting the growth of
saprophytic fungi. Overall, a yield loss of up to 10% was
found attributable to cereal aphids on winter wheat by
Rabbinge et al. Prew et al. (1983) compared the effects of
eight factors on the growth and nutrient uptake of winter
wheat and found that the largest yield increases (up to 15%)
were obtained by controlling for aphids and leaf diseases.
The DSIR has investigated the effects of RGA on cereal
crop yields under New Zealand conditions. Stufkens and
Farrell (1984 & 1985a) report the results of experiments in
which cereal crops were treated with Pirimicarb to control
for aphids. The yields of the treated crops were compared
with yields from untreated plots. Aphid numbers on C!OPs
were also recorded in these experiments. Although there
were variations between years, the results indicated that
spraying for the RGA had a significant effect on crop
yields. Table 1 summarises the results of these studies.
In discussing their results, Stufkens and Farrell
(1985a) make a number of points regarding individual crops
which are summarised below:
Oats. Oats may be regarded as being regularly at
risk from RGA damage. Table 1 demonstrates that spraying
for RGA on oats almost always gave a statistically
significant improvement in yield, up to 41% in 198'3-84 for
spring oats.
(5 )
(6 )
.Ba~J§Y. Spring barley showed no statistically
significant response to the insecticide in 1983-84 but in
1984-85 it was heavily infested and showed a significant
response to spray treatment. It is possible that yield
losses due to RGA damage were widespread in that season,
according to Stufkens and Farrell. They state that "barley
may be p~rticularly subject to aphid damage varying in
intensity from year to year under the influence of climate".
Wheat. Winter wheat supported relatively low numbers
of RGA. It showed a significant yield response to
Pirimicarb in 1983-84, but none in 1984-85. The 1983-84
results should be treated with caution, according to
Stufkens and Farrell, due to the relatively low levels of
infestation occurring on wheat (10-15 aphids per tiller in
unsprayed plots) during the period of the trial.
The informal survey of Canterbury farmers enabled some
further insights to be gained into the impact of RGA. It
must be remembered that these results should not be
construed as providing scientific evidence. In general
farmers did not appear to be especially concerned about
aphid damage. Although they were aware of the presence of
aphids on their crops they had little idea what impact they
might have on crop yields. Most identified barley or wheat
as having aphid infestations in the pa~t while oats were
also mentioned by some. ,In general, there appeared to be
little perception of different levels of infestation on
different crops.
A difficulty with estimating the effects of RGA on
crop yields is that aphid infestations may occur very
heavily in a localised area, while other areas are
unaffected. In New Zealand little or no data is available
on the extent of RGA damage to North Island grain areas.
These areas may have suffered only minor losses from RGA if
aphid numbers are relatively low. However, some areas of
the South Island appear to have suffered considerable damage
as the Stufkens and Farrell studies show. The severity of
aphid infestations also varies from year to year, depending
on a, complex combination of factors such as climate and
interactions with predators.
In order to determine the economic impact of RGA in
the absence of control measures it is necessary to make a
number of assumptions regarding factors such as the level of
damage likely to be caused by the pest, the average size of
New Zealand's'cereal crop harvest, and the value of the
crops affected.
Using the Stufkens and Farrell data summarised in
Table 1 as a guide, Table 2 shows estimates of high, medium
and low levels of yield loss assumed to be inflicted by RGA
on national wheat, barley and oats production. While these
figures are estimates, they do fall within the range of
yield losses reported by Stufkens and Farrell based on their
(7)
research at Lincoln. It may be arguable whether or not the
"high" levels of loss would occur nationally. However, the
DSIR research certainly indicates that losses caused by RGA
may have reached these levels in the Lincoln area in the
past.
Table 1
Percentage Increases in Yield from Spraying for RGA
Crop
1983-84 1984-85 1984-85
E101 E501 Ll02 L50 2 GS41 3 GS55 3 GS41+GS55 3 courtenay4
Spring barley 5 7 1
Autumn barley 5
Spring oats 28* 41** 16 9
Autumn oats 12* 5
Spring wheat 1 9
Autumn wheat 10* 1
14
13*
6
8
4
I 5
11*
10*
4
16
------_ .. -._-_._._..._-_ .._.__._•..._--_.._--------------
Notes:
spray starting date at flowering stage when
threshold of 10 or 50 aphids per tiller,
3 ~
2.
1.
indicates no insecticide applied
E10, E50 refer to early spray starting date at any stage when aphid
density reaches a threshold of 10 or 50 aphids per tiller,
respectively.
LI0, L50 refer to late
aphid density reaches a
respectively.
Spray applied at GS (growth stage) 41, 55 or both. Zadoks et al.
(1974) describes the growth stage definitions used.
4. Unreplicated trial.
* P ( 0.05 for comparison with untreated
** P ( 0.01 for comparison with untreated
Source: Adapted from Stufkens and Farrell, 1984, 1985a.
Table 2
Assumed Yield Losses Due to RGA Damage (%)
Crop High Medium Low
Wheat
Barley
Oats
10
15
30
5
7.5
10
o
1
5
( 8 )
The extent to which wheat is at risk is also
problematical. Farrell (pers comm) feels that in New
Zealand wheat is unlikely to suffer much damage from RGA,
based on DSIR research. Surveys have shown consistently
lower numbers of RGA on wheat than on barley or oats in
Canterbury (Farrell and Stufkens 1988b). However, some of
the Can~erbury farmers spoken to had sprayed wheat to
control aphids and did not perceive aphid numbers to be
lower on wheat than other cereals. Overseas research also
indicates that wheat may be susceptible to aphid attacks
although much of this work was done in 1979 when heavy
flights overcame wheat resistance to RGA (Farrell
pers comm.). Because of these apparent contradictions, the
"low" damage level for wheat was assumed to be 0% (as
Farrell would suggest) while the "high" figure was set at
10%, about that found in overseas studies and recorded by
Stufkens and Farrell on autumn wheat in 1983-84. It should
be emphasised that these yield loss assumptions are intended
to provide a basis from which to calculate the likely range
of crop damage rather than to estimate accurately the extent
of that damage.
Table 3 shows some details of recent trends in New
Zealand grain production. The latest data available from
the Department of Statistics at the time of writing is for
the 1986-87 year. However, areas sown and total production
of cereals for 1987-88 are thought to have been lower than
for 1986-87, particularly for wheat which is estimated to
have declined by about 35%. The effects of the drought in
Canterbury and South Canterbury will also result in much
lower yields in the 1988-89 season. Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries forecasts of production in 1988 and 1989 are
included in Table 3. Due to relatively low world prices for
grain and the financial difficulties of the arable sector it
is unlikely that New Zealand grain production will rise
significantly in the near future although recent news is
that cereal acreage will rise in 1989/90.
Approximately half to two-thirds of New Zealand's
cereal crop is grown in the Aoranqi and Canterbury local
government regions so that any losses in these areas can
significantly affect overall national production. For
instance, a 1~% yield loss in barley grown in Canterbury
alone equates to approximately a 3% loss nationally even if
no other area is affected. If Aorangi suffers a similar
loss as well, this then represents 8% of the national barley
crop. This suggests that the medium level of yield loss
shown in Table 2 may potentially have occurred in the past,
if the findings of DSIR research can be applied to the whole
Canterbury/Aorangi region. The yield loss estimates
therefore represent plausible bounds on the levels of damage
caused by the RGA.
Table 3
Areas and Yields of Crops'
.....__~_ .._.-.- .------_..__ ..._----_...._--_...~_~~_._----
1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89
........ forecasts ........
--------_._.~...__ .---~._ .......~_ .._..-_~.~ ....~~_~- ..., _...~"'_._.__._-_.__..._------
Area Total Area Total Area Total Area Total Area Total Area Total
Sown Yield Sown Yield Sown Yield Sown Yield Sown Yield Sown Yield
ha tonnes ha tonnes ha tonnes ha tonnes ha tonnes ha tonnes
Wheat
N.r. 7856 38702 11245 48745 11817 48404 12602 49927
S. r. 60824 275854 60598 260846 79718 331310 70361 286896
Canterbury 45554 205475 49158 207142 64742 262281 56502 218834
N.Z. Total 68680 314556 71843 309591 91535 379714 82963 336823 53000 228000 50000 210000
I.D
~
Barley
N.r. 20852 95769 22974 95357 22737 87684 17176 68949
S. r. 104563 475241 129358 549012 115814 468511 85307 331696
Canterbury 71966 321083 91281 371329 83481 319372 62336 226325
N.Z. Total 125415 571010 152332 644369 138551 556195 102483 400645 86000- 378000 83000 350000
Oats
N. r. 1752 6017 1145 3880 1267 4080 1777 6030
S. r. 17994 68754 12315 47102 14611 55829 18970 72580
Canterbury 9716 36064 5638 19897 7456 25031 10243 34069
N.Z. Total 19746 74771 13460 50982 15878 59909 20747 78610 21000 78000 20000 75000
......_---_..---
Note: Canterbury includes Canterbury and Aorangi Local Government Regions for 1984-85 onwards.
Sources: New Zealand Department of Statistics, MAF.
(10)
In the past, approximately 85% to 90% of New Zealand
wheat has been milled, with the remaining 10% to 15% used
for feed. Similarly, about 85% of barley is malted and 15%
used for feed, on average. These ratios can be expected to
continue to apply in the foreseeable future with minor
variations from year to year. It is important to allow for
these p~oportions in valuing the damage caused by RGA
because of the lower prices attached to feed grain.
In general, grain prices vary from year to year due to
factors such as world market conditions and local production
and demand levels. For the purposes of estimating'the cost
of RGA damage the actual prices applying in anyone year may
not necessarily be appropriate. MAFCorp produces annual
estimates of product price assumptions to be used for
planning purposes which are likely to be a sounder basis for
this analysis. Their projections for cereal crops, in
1 January 1988 dollars, are presented in Table 4. These
prices are medium term average projections and are intended
to be used specifically for planning purposes. As such
these prices are also suitable for use in cost-benefit
analysis.
Table 4
Agricultural Crop Values
------------------._.._-,-----,_._------------
Crop Mean at Farm Gate
$ per tonne
Standard Deviation
----------..._---------_...-...._..__....._------ -------------
Wheat - milling - N.I.
- S. I.
Wheat - feed
Barley - feed 1
Barley - malting
Oats
223
210
163
153
210
163
32.7
32.7
26.6
26.6
41. 4
26.6
-.... _ .... --_......._--- -._.-_....._-------_.,-'-.------- -------
Notes: 1. A price differential of about $45 per tonne is
expected between N.I. and S.I. malting barley
Dollars are as at 1 January 1988.
Source: MAFCorp Product Price Assumptions
Combining the estimates of yield loss with a range of
projected grain production levels and the MAFCorp prices
enables the calculation of a range of estimated losses for
each crop due to RGA damage in the absence of control.
Table 5 summarises some results from such calculations.
(10)
(11)
Table 5
Estimated Cost of RGA Damage ($1988)
-----,-_.".. .-... .- .- ...._". ' --_.,...~- .... .._.~.-~-- •...._,,-~,.,-~._-_ .._._---_.-
NZ Total Canterbury1 Level of RGA Damage I Infestation
Crop Production Production High Medium Ww
tonnes tonnes NZ Canty NZ Canty NZ Canty
Only Only Only
'000 dollars
...... _" --_.._-_ .. .. ....... _.._-._-_....__...._-_ ..-_._.-_._. .. -- ....._-_ ... _..... , --
Wheat 330000 215000 6765 4408 3383 2204 0 0
210000 135000 4305 2768 2153 1384 0 0
200000 130000 4100 2665 2050 1333 0 0
Barley 500000 280000 15000 8400 7500 4200 1000 560
400000 225000 12000 6750 6000 3375 800 450
350000 195000 10500 5850 5250 2925 700 390
300000 17ססoo 9000 5100 4500 2550 600 340
Oats 80000 35000 3912 1712 1304 571 652 285
75000 32000 3668 1565 1223 611 261
50000 21000 2445 1027 815 342 408 171
.-_ .._.-~--_._,- .._- . --..._.. ".'---'".--." ... _-_. ...-.._--_...._--~---_¥ ......_---_.. __..__ .- .-~_._-
• • I •Notes: 1 Canterbury mcludes Aorangl and Canterbury local government reglOns
The different production levels reflect the likely range of production
for each crop.
What these figures show is that even at low levels of
production and low levels of damage, the RGA is likely to
cause at least $1 million worth of crop losses annually if
no control measures are taken. At 1987 production levels,
high yield loss on a national basis would cost approximately
$20 million. If yield loss is restricted to Canterbury, the
loss would be about S10 million. In fact, it is probable
that losses from oat growers alone may exceed $0.5 million
per annum, and that damage to barley crops caused by the RGA
results in crop losses worth $3 million to $4 million. Even
the most conservative estimates, then, suggest the RGA to be
of considerable economic significance. The Stufkens and
Farrell studies suggest that at least one season with losses
at the "medium" level may already have occurred, potentially
costing over $10 million nationally. The magnitude of such
losses indicates that even if RGA damage was confined to
serious outbreaks in only some regions at periodic intervals
it would still impose high costs on the nation as a whole.
While it is not possible to assess the likely damage
the pest has caused in the past, some estimates of the
potential costs may be made. By taking the average yield
loss from the Stufkens and Farrell studies for cereals grown
in 83-84 and 84-85, and valuing the loss of cereal crops
grown in the Canterbury and Aorangi local government regions
at the prices applying in those years, some further
estimates may be obtained. Converting these estimates to
(11)
(12)
1988 dollars shows that if the yield responses recorded at
Lincoln had applied to the entire Canterbury/Aorangi harvest
in those years, losses of approximately $8 million and $15
million may have occurred in 1983-84 and 1984-85
respectively. As farmers may have used chemical sprays in
those years, and the damage may have been variable across
the province, these figures are not intended to reflect
actual lo~ses - they merely demonstrate the magnitude of
losses which could have occurred.
2.2 !?a};:.JE?Y Yellow Dwarf Virus D;i,se<3..~e
Barley Yellow Dwarf Virus (BYDV) is a disease which
may infect cereal crops. The severity and extent of the
disease varies from year to year. As reported by Stufkens
and Farrell (198Gb), BYDV was rare in Canterbury during 1983
and 1984. However, widespread BYDV symptoms were seen in
winter barley in the Lincoln area in 1985 at a low rate of
plant infection. The disease was locally severe at Lincoln
where infection increased to 30% in winter barley and 80% in
spring barley by late November 1985. RGA is a vector of
BYDV in Australia (Waterhouse et al 1985) and Stufkens and
Farrell (198Gb) show that RGA is likely to be an important
vector of BYDV in New Zealand.
The disease can cause yield loss and damage to cereal
crops. In localised areas, losses up to 20-30% from BYDV
are possible in severe infestations. Stufkens and Farrell
(198Gb) report one case where BYDV was associated with over
40% reject grain passing an AG (2.4 mm slot) screen.
Although losses vary from year to year, RGA has been clearly
implicated by DSIR research as a major vector spreading the
disease in cereal crops. It is therefore important to
account for any costs associated with BYDV when estimating
the costs imposed by RGA.
But in attempting to assess the costs of BYDV
attributable to the presence of RGA a number of difficulties
arise. Firstly, the localised nature of outbreaks, and the
fluctuation from year to year, makes it very difficult to
ascertain with any accuracy the national costs. Moreover,
while it appears that RGA is the major vector for spreading
the virus, the possibility that other vectors may be acting
cannot be excluded. The cereal aphid, Rhopalosiphum padi,
is known to be a vector and other aphids have also been
found to spread the disease (Stufkens and Farrell 198Gb).
As well as reducing yields, the disease may also result in
grain being downgraded and thus receiving a lower price.
This in fact may be the most probable outcome of BYDV
infection for a particular crop. But there is little data
on the extent and likelihood of such downgrading.
Overall, the difficulties discussed prevent the
accurate calculation of any loss attributable to RGA
associated with BYDV disease. Stufkens and Farrell (198Gb)
(12)
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estimated that throughout the mid Canterbury area the rate
of infection of BYDV was about 1% or less in 1985 - a year
in which BYDV infection was much greater than usual.
Perhaps the best that can be said is that the disease is
likely to result in at most a 1% reduction in overall
national production of barley; but in most years the cost is
likely to be negligible. At 1987 production levels, 1% of
the "national barley crop would be worth approximately
$800,000 so that losses due to BYDV are unlikely to exceed
$lM in any year.
In the absence of biocontrol attempts, the only
practical option to control RGA in New Zealand is to spray
with insecticides. Pirimicarb was used in the DSIR research
discussed in earlier sections as an aphid specific
insecticide it has advantages for control of RGA because it
is less likely to harm beneficial insects which prey on
aphids. The levels of insecticide necessary depend upon the
level of infestation. Overseas experience has shown that
farmers spray too late to effectively control aphids (Carter
et al. 1980) as aphid build-ups can be difficult to detect.
Farmers questioned in the Canterbury area appeared to have
preferred not to spray for aphids unless a serious problem
was apparent. Some, however, did include an insecticide or
aphicide in sprays on cereal crops in order to control BYDV.
It would seem therefore that the actual costs of chemicals
used in aphid control in the past are relatively low.
However, chemical control represents an alternative to
biocontrol. Therefore, the costs of ongoing chemical
treatment can be compared with the costs of developing a
successful biological control regime.
One or two applications of Pirimicarb at a rate of
125 g/ha was recommended for effective control of RGA by the
DSIR. It was found that two applications were needed at
times. From price information available in the 1988
Financial Budget Manual published by Lincoln College, a
single application of Pirimicarb at the recommended rate
costs $11.30 per hectare, approximately, for the chemical
alone. Application costs would depend on the method used,
but for example, aerial application would cost about $27-$30
per hectare while contract spraying could cost between $13
and $18 per hectare. These figures are again taken from the
Financial Budget Manual. Therefore, assuming only a single
application was used with contract spraying at $13 per·
hectare, in order to chemically treat the entire New Zealand
~ereal grain crop - an area of at least 150,000 ha - the
minimum cost would be $3.6 million at 1988 cost levels.
Taking into account the possibility of a need for two
treatments, and a likelihood of higher application costs in
some cases, a figure of up to $5 million for chemical
control costs does not appear unreasonable. This represents
an annual outlay necessary to be reasonably confident of
(13)
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preventing RGA damage. Compared to the potential losses
calculated in the previous section the cost of qhemical
treatment at $3.6-$5 million annually appears justified if
this is the only alternative for effective control of the
pest. Biological control, if effective, represents a much
cheaper alternative. The effectiveness of biocontrol is
discussed in Chapter 3. It should be stressed that the
figure of $3.6 to $5 million is the estimated cost of
effective chemical control, not the actual current costs of
such control. The current practice of most farmers is not
to spray crops unless significant aphid numbers are present.
The preceding sections have examined some of the major
economic costs RGA is likely to impose on the New Zealand
arable sector. Estimates, or ranges, of these costs were
determined. The following table summarises the costs of RGA
calculated.
Table 6
Annual Costs of RGA ($1988)
Direct Costs - loss of yield
Cost of BYDV
Cost of Chemical Control
$lm-$20m
average approx. $5m-$6m
$O-$lm
$3.6m-$5m
Some further costs of RGA may also be identified.
These include damage to other plants and crops during
overwintering of the aphid. Although Farrell and Stufkens
found little evidence of this, overseas research indicates
that roses and pasture may host RGA. Also, greenfeed oats
were found to harbour significant numbers of the pest. In
addition to direct yield loss associated with RGA damage, it
is likely that crops will suffer stress which may lead to a
lower quality of grain being produced. There is some
evidence in published research to indicate that RGA may
cause kernels to be smaller than on non-infested grain. No
attempt is made to quantify these costs but they do
represent real additional costs to be borne by the
communi ty.
Overall, it can be seen that in economic terms the RGA
is a significant pest.
(14)
CHAPTER 3
Aphidius rhopalosiphi was introduced into New Zealand
from Britain and France in April and June of 1985. The DSIR
chose this species as a potential biocontrol agent for RGA
because it was recorded as the most frequent parasitoid of
RGA in southern England and in western France (Dean et ale
1981 and Rabasse and Dedryver 1983). Unpublished evidence
from South American experiences also indicated that the
parasitoid could effectively control RGA.
Stufkens and Farrell (1987a) describe how the
parasitoids supplied from Britain and France were reared
through three generations under laboratory conditions at the
DSIR at Lincoln. Subsequently the parasitoid was released
at a number of sites throughout New Zealand. Table 7
reproduces a table from Stufkens and Farrell (1987a) showing
Table 7
Numbers (x 1000) of A. rhopalosiphi mummies
at cereal sites between July 1985/and January 1987
Counties No. of
sites
Manawatu 1
Marlborough 3
Cheviot (C) 1
Eyre (C) 1
Ellesmere, Paparua (C) 6
Ashburton (C) 2
Southland, Wallace 6
TOTAL 20
Releases
1985 1986 1987 TOTAL
5 5
3 3
5 5
2 2
149 6 155
5 3 8
3 5 8
159 17 10 186
._ ...,------,..
Note: (C) = Canterbury counties
Source: Stufkens and Farrell (1987a)
details of the release programme which was undertaken.
Altogether a total of 186,000 RGA mummies containing the
parasitoid were released, mainly in Canterbury and other
South Island cereal growing areas. These releases took
place over a period from June 1985 to January 1987.
The spread and population of the parasitoid was
monitored by surveying South Island cereal growing areas
between November 1986 and January 1987. The results of
these surveys are also reported in Stufkens and Farrell
(15 )
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Table 8
Recoveries of A. rhopalosiphi and hyperparasites
from cereal sites (November-December 1986).
Values are for total sites surveyed, number of sites where
A. rhopa~osiphi was present, total A. rhopalosiphi recovered
and numbers of the hyperparasites* reared from RGA mummies.
Counties Total
Sites
Sites
Present
Total
Recovered
No. Hyper-
parasites
Marlborough
Cheviot, Hurunui (C)
Eyre, Oxford (C)
Ellesmere, Paparua (C)
Ashburton (C)
Strathallen (C)
Southland, Wallace
TOTAL
23
12
34
54
33
10
31
197
o
8
27
32
16
7
3
93
20
38
75
64
30
18
245
2
6
4
1
13
Notes: * =
(C) =
Alloxysta infuscata, Pachyneuron aphidis,
Dendrocerus sp.
Canterbury counties
Source: Stufkens and Farrell (1987a)
(1987a). RGA mummies were collected from nearly 200 sites
and the emerging parasites identified. By late 1986 to
early 1987 the parasitoid had become well established, as
shown in Table 8 which is reproduced from the Stufkens and
Farrell paper. No parasitoids were reported as recovered
from Manawatu. However, 63% of surveyed sites in Canterbury
yielded the parasitoid. Some recoveries from Timaru and
Cheviot were 60-90 km from the original release sites
approximately a year earlier, indicating a considerable
dispersal.
On the basis of their surveys and other observations,
Stufkens and Farrell (1987a) concluded that:
"The establishment of A. rhopalosiphi in Canterbury
has been marked by rapid dispersal and distribution on a
high proportion of cereal crops. Maximum population
density of A. rhopalosiphi and parasitoid/prey ratios were
comparable with those recorded in southern England and
western France. The suitability of the Canterbury habitat
for A. rhopalosiphi may be associated with the cycle of
cereal crops and cereal regrowth in a mild maritime climate
that allows survival and reproduction of prey and
parasitoid throughout the year."
(17)
since that time, unpublished recordings indicate the
parasitoid to be widely established throughout the South
Island. A. rhopalosiphi was found to be present at all
sites sampled in Marborough, Canterbury and Southland
(M. Stufkens, pers comm). The parasitoid has also
established successfully in the Manawatu where levels of
parasitism are similar to those in the South Island (P.
McGregor, pers comm)
Given these findings there is reason to expect that
the parasitoid has had an effect on RGA numbers since its
introduction. The extent of this impact is explored in the
following section.
3.2 :rmpe:t_gtof Biocontrol
Since RGA first appeared in New Zealand in 1982, and
the parasitoid was introduced in 1985, there was little
opportunity to monitor RGA numbers in the absence of
biocontrol. The limited published evidence suggests that
RGA reached very high levels in some years, with peak
concentrations ranging from 10-240 aphids/tiller in 1983 and
1984 (reported by Stufkens and Farrell 1984, 1985a, 1985b).
Infestations of 50-150 aphids/tiller were recorded by
Stufkens (unpublished) as early as December 1982.
In 1983 and 1984, Stufkens and Farrell surveyed cereal
and grass paddocks for occurrence of RGA. Roses and sweet
briar were also examined. In all, 20-100 sites on 1-4 days
per month were surveyed. RGA was found to infest wheat, oat
and barley crops in both seasons in the Lincoln area. Its
annual cycle appeared to be largely restricted to cereal
crops. The likely damage caused, and the cost of this
damage, has been discussed in the previous Chapter.
Anecdotal evidence from Canterbury farmers also
suggests that RGA was perceived as a potential problem on
cereal crops during this period. Several of those spoken to
commented that aphids had been especially bad three to four
years ago. Following the release of the parasitoid,
however, RGA has not occurred in the same concentrations and
the informal survey conducted found no Canterbury farmers
who have sprayed specifically for aphids since about 1984.
Some continued to spray to control BYDV, however, or
routinely treated crops regardless of aphid numbers.
The rapid establishment and dispersal of the
parasitoid were discussed in the previous section. In
addition to establishment, to estimate the impact of
biocontrol it is necessary to examine where possible the
influence A. rhopalosiphi has had on RGA numbers. In
Stufkens and Farrell (1987al the ratio of RGA/parasite
numbers was examined for a number of crops at Lincoln in
1986. Maximum parasitoid to prey ratios were comparable to
those recorded overseas. In November 1988, the proportion
(18 )
of parasitised sub-adult RGA was 60-90% in winter barley at
Lincoln, 95-100% in spring barley at Lincoln and Rangiora,
65% on oats in Southland (Farrell pers comm) and 80% to 90%
on spring barley in the Manawatu (P. McGregor pers comm).
This research also indicates that RGA numbers are much lower
than previously recorded levels. In fact, in sampling
carried qut at the end of 1988, the parasitoid was found to
be more numerous than RGA at some sites. Whereas RGA
numbers in earlier years rose rapidly to a peak in November,
in the past two years this has not occurred. Farrell and
Stufkens (1988a) showed that RGA maxima on spring barley and
spring suction trap catches of RGA, declined greatly between
1984 and 1987. Farrell attributes this to the effect of the
parasitoid which responds very rapidly to any increase in
RGA numbers. Crop damage due to RGA has apparently been
negligible.
In addition to its effect on RGA, A. rhopalosiphi has
demonstrated the ability to parasitise other aphids, most
notably the cereal aphid (CA) (Rhopalosiphum padi). While CA
has not posed the same problems as the more recently
introduced RGA, it is a known vector of BYDV and this
unexpected side-effect represents an additional bonus from
biocontrol.
Some hyper-parasitism of A.rhopalosiphi has been
recorded, but as Table 8 showed, not to a great extent.
Hyper-parasitism is not expected to significantly reduce the
effectiveness of the parasitoid.
The evidence so far collected by DSIR researchers,
some of which has yet to be published, indicates that
A. rhopalosiphi has become well established and has already
reduced peak RGA populations. Based on these observations
and overseas experience in countries such as Brazil and
Chile which introduced the same parasitoid to control RGA in
the 1970s, RGA is no longer anticipated to cause problems
for cereal crops in New Zealand under normal seasonal
conditions. Other countries which have introduced
A. rhopalosiphi, or where the parasitoid occurs naturally,
have few significant problems with cereal aphids. There
appears no reason not to expect that biocontrol of RGA will
therefore be maintained into the foreseeable future.
This statement must be qualified to a certain extent,
however. It is likely that the use of insecticides on
cereal crops may actually increase the damage caused by RGA.
Stufkens and Farrell (1985) report the case of a barley crop
at Templeton treated with Pirimicarb for RGA where after
initially killing most of the aphids, a very rapid build-up
in aphids occurred at the grain filling stage. This is
attributable to the lack of predators, which were also
affected by the insecticide.
(19)
Therefore, if chemical treatments are used in
conjunction with biocontrol of RGA, a delicate balance must
be maintained. Farrell (pers. comm.) suggests that no
chemical treatments are necessary better control may be
achieved by allowing parasitoids and other natural predators
to control the RGA. The experience of Canterbury farmers in
the ljmited time since introduction of the parasitoid seems
to confirm this view. Farmers spoken to were reluctant to
apply insecticides because of their likely effects on
predators.
Although the parasitoid has adapted successfully to
New Zealand conditions, the relationship between the
parasitoid and the RGA 1S dynamic. While all the
indications are that the parasitoid will continue to
exercise a high degree of control over RGA, the future level
of control achieved is likely to fluctuate from time to
time.

CHAPTER 4
Costs andBe~efits of_~~ocontr9!
4 .1 ~()~J:~__gj:_ IlllP:l~m~l1.t::i,ngBiocontrol
Selecting, introducing and monitoring a biocontrol
agent is a lengthy and costly exercise. The DSIR
investigation of RGA began in 1983 soon after the appearance
of the pest. Their research continued until the end of 1988
- no further work is planned specifically to look at RGA as
it is now felt that the pest is under control. Over the six
year period in question quite significant resources have
been committed to studying RGA and later the parasitoid,
with two researchers working full time on the project.
Clearly this represents a large investment by the DSIR.
According to the DSIR, the salaries of the researchers
involved amounted to approximately $88,000 per year, in 1988
dollars. In order to calculate the full costs of research,
salary costs have been multiplied by three to account for
additional costs such as travelling and overheads.
Therefore, the integrated pest management study of RGA cost
$264,000 per annum. The DSIR estimates that over the six
year period in question, five years of the researchers' time
was devoted to specifically RGA research so that the total
cost of the project is $1.32 million. Of this time,
approximately one year was devoted specifically to
biological control. The cost of the biological control
component of the research is therefore $264,000.
The costs of introducing and releasing the parasitoid,
and the costs of monitoring and studying the relationship
between parasitoid and aphid, have been borne solely by the
DSIR.
No further major costs are expected in future as the
DSIR has concluded this phase of its research on cereal
aphids and the parasitoid appears to be well established
throughout the country. The estimate of $1.32 million
therefore represents the full cost of implementing
biocontrol.
Effectively this investment is a sunk cost. However,
it can be compared with the expected benefits or returns
from the biocontrol project to see whether the investment
was justified on economic grounds, or to calculate a return
on the expense incurred.
(21 )
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Chapter 2 discussed and where possible quantified the
costs imposed by RGA on New Zealand agriculture in the
absence of biocontrol. If biocontrol was to be 100%
effective (RGA is eradicated) the benefits of biocontrol
would be simply the sum of these costs, on an annual basis
(In fact,"' eradication of RGA is not a possibility).
It is not fully clear which costs are appropriate,
however. The greatest potential costs imposed by RGA
related to the damage it caused to cereal plants and the
consequent loss of yield. The extent of this damage was
seen to be variable with the severity of infestation, which
in turn depended on seasonal climatic conditions and other
similar factors. Nevertheless, under moderate levels of
infestation the cost of RGA damage in the absence of
biocontrol (and hence the benefits of 100% biocontrol) were
seen to be significant, of the order of $3 million to $7
million annually. However, if chemical control was used as
an alternative to biological control, the annual costs would
be from $3.6 million to $5 million. If it is assumed, as
appears reasonable, that farmers would use chemicals to
control aphids in a year of high infestation then aphid
damage should be avoided even without biocontrol. In this
case, biocontrol would save no more 'than the cost of
chemical treatment - a maximum of about $5 million annually
(in 1988 dollars). Provided that chemicals are used
effectively there should not be even the potential for crop
losses (biocontrol benefits) of the 'high' orders of
magnitude discussed earlier.
A number of questions could still be raised. Will
farmers always use spray correctly to achieve full control?
Some published evidence (Carter et al 1980) suggests not.
Are outbreaks of aphids always detected? What impact will
the use of chemicals have on the parasitoid? As has been
noted earlier, Farrell reports some evidence suggesting that
incorrect use of chemicals may actually benefit RGA by
reducing predators. A degree of uncertainty surrounds the
answers to many of these questions - the determination of
precise benefits from biocontrol is not possible. The
dynamic relationship between RGA and the parasitoid
compounds this problem as the impact of biocontrol is likely
to vary from year to year.
However, it is possible to determine what the range of
the benefits will be, subject to a number of assumptions.
Table 9 presents the benefits from increased yields given
10%, 50% and 90% effective biocontrol respectively under a
range of levels of aphid infestation. This uses cost data
from the calculations presented earlier in Table 5 of
Chapter 2, with projected 1989 areas sown used as a basis,
and summing losses/benefits over the three cereals wh~at,
oats and barley.
(23 )
Table 9
Annual Benefits from Biocontrol
- Prevention of Yield Loss
($ 1988 '000)
Lev~l of Damage!
Infestation N Z
10%
Canty
Only
% of Contl:"ol A<::h~e\Te_d
50% 90%
- _.- -- ....-
N Z Canty N Z Canty
Only Only
-----_._--------.----------------------------_.----------------_.._-----
High
Medium
Low
1850
860
130
1020
480
65
9240
4310
660
5090
2420
330
16630
7760
1180
9165
4350
590
--------_._----------_.-_._--------..-.-_._. -----._--------------
Notes % Control Achieved refers to the % of RGA damage
prevented by the parasitoid.
As before, Canterbury refers to the Canterbury and
Aorangi local government regions
In the opinion of DSIR experts the level of control
achieved by the parasitoid greatly exceeds 50%. Indeed, as
suggested in Chapter 3, they believe/the control to be such
that RGA no longer poses a serious economic problem for
cereal growers. At 90% control, the benefits of biocontrol
range from $590,000 to over $9 million on an annual basis
for Canterbury farmers alone. Even with a 50% reduction in
RGA damage, given the assumptions described previously,
biocontrol would save Canterbury/Aorangi farmers at least
$300,000 annually. The overall national benefit could be
significantly greater than this. Moreover, assuming that
RGA infestations at much higher levels might occur
periodically in the absence of biocontrol, the average
annual benefits are also likely to be much greater. For the
reasons discussed, a single annual net benefit figure is
impossible to estimate, but the ranges shown are based on
conservative assumptions.
A number of additional benefits are obtained from
successful biocontrol. No attempt has been made in this
study to value the benefit from the parasitoid attacking
other aphids, notably the cereal aphid (R. padi) as well as
RGA. The benefits calculated have included no allowance for
crops other than wheat, barley and oats sustaining RGA
damage. Green feed cereal crops would also appear to be at
some risk from RGA. A further, non-measurable benefit is
that biocontrol results in less use of chemicals which can
be seen as beneficial for environmental reasons. Finally,
no account has been taken of crop quality factors - however,
it appears likely that RGA would reduce the quality as well
as yield of cereal crops.
(24 )
It is also likely that given the magnitude of savings
involved some impact on areas of crops sown has occurred or
will occur in future. This sort of interaction between
yields and areas, and the effect this has on grain prices,
is beyond the scope of the current study.
The preceding sections have discussed the costs and
benefits of biocontrol. Treating the overall DSIR research
costs of approximately $1 million as an investment, the
likely minimum expected annual benefit of $300,000 would
'repay' the initial $1 million outlay in just over six
years, at a 10% discount rate. A discount rate of 10%,
reflecting a time preference for money, is common in project
analysis. After five years at a 10% discount rate, an
annual stream of $300,000 would have an accumulated net
present value of $1.31 million after six years and $1.46
after seven years. Even under conservative assumptions,
then, the DSIR investment in development of integrated
management strategies for RGA is likely to be repaid within
six to seven years and to give positive returns in the
longer term. The biocontrol component of the research,
costing $264,000, would be repaid within one year.
,
The maximum annual benefit appears to be in the region
of $5 million, assuming severe crop losses could be
prevented by use of chemical sprays in the absence of
biocontrol. This would represent a substantial immediate
gain from the initial "investment" in biocontrol. Table 10
summarises the costs and benefits discussed so far and where
possible quantifies these with values presented in earlier
sections.
Table 10
Summary of Costs and Benefits of Integrated
Pest Management, Including Biocontrol
(all figures in $ 1988)
~9_§l..t§.: DSIR research $1.32 million approximately
"sunk" cost linvestment.
~~}l~Jits: - Increased cereal crop yields: $300,000 to
$5 million p.a. Original research costs
repaid in 1-7 years at 10% discount rate.
- Reduction in chemical costs: $3.6 to $5
million p.a.
- Reduction of BYDV.
- Spin-off attack of CA and other ahids.
- Benefits to other plants e.g. greenfeed
oats, roses.
- Improved environment from reduction ~n
chemical usage.
- Improved grain quality.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
The preceding economic evaluation of biocontrol of the
RGA has clearly shown that, based on the data available, and
a number of reasonable (and fairly conservative)
assumptions, the DSIR's biocontrol project was justified on
economic grounds. Although there may be variations in the
level of control from year to year, the analysis presented
in Chapter 4 suggests that in future the annual return to
the nation on the DSIR investment in research into
integrated pest management of RGA is positive. It was found
that the investment would be repaid within seven years even
under very conservative assumptions. If the biocontrol
component of the research was treated separately, the costs
of this research would be repaid within a single year. In
fact it appears possible that in the three years since
introduction of the parasitoid it has already accrued
benefits in excess of the costs of the DSIR's RGA research.
In the introduction it was stated that the benefits of
biocontrol represent gains to the nation as a whole.
However, it is obvious that some individuals benefit to a
far greater extent than others - in this case those farmers
in grain growing areas where RGA has been prevalent. The
question of whether those who benefit should contribute in
some way to the costs of research of this nature is beyond
the scope of this study. This becomes a political rather
than a strictly economic issue. It is a question that the
DSIR may need to consider in the future, however, as it
seeks funds to conduct long term research of this nature.
Few biocontrol agents are likely to prove as
successful as A. rhopalisiphi appears to be. A fortuitous
combination of climate and crop cycles appears to have aided
the rapid establishment of the parasitoid and contributed to
its success. While the biocontrol research has proved to be
justified on economic grounds, when consideration is given
to undertaking future biocontrol projects it will become
increasingly important to perform at least a preliminary
economic analysis before committing resources to them.
(25)
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